Urban Planning
sara vosoughi; Farshad Nourian
Abstract
HighlightsDrawing on a Foucauldian framework, power dynamically reconstitutes legality through competing discourses.Elite urban informality becomes legitimized where power actors construct competing discourses of vested rights during the revision of the Samen district plan.Elite informality is reproduced ...
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HighlightsDrawing on a Foucauldian framework, power dynamically reconstitutes legality through competing discourses.Elite urban informality becomes legitimized where power actors construct competing discourses of vested rights during the revision of the Samen district plan.Elite informality is reproduced through conflicts of power rooted in contradictions within the formal urban planning system.The dualities of central vs. local authority, public vs. private interests, enforcement vs. non-enforcement, and regulation vs. deregulation reinforce elite informality.The reproduction of elite informality challenges the conventional formality/informality binary in urban governance.Extended Abstract IntroductionA significant portion of the literature on informality emphasizes the state’s role in suspending or manipulating the law. Much of this scholarship portrays informality as “from above,” where the state is considered a unified actor with control over legality, and law itself is treated as an objective, stable, and neutral framework for bureaucratic action.However, more recent approaches have shifted toward de-centering the state, conceptualizing power as dispersed and law as indeterminate. In this perspective, law is not a fixed foundation but a socially constructed and continuously contested phenomenon shaped by diverse actors.This article follows this newer trajectory by analyzing the dynamic interconnections between law and power in urban governance. Specifically, it investigates how competing actors—state and non-state alike—mobilize discourses of legality to reproduce elite informality. The case of the Samen district plan in Mashhad provides an instructive example, as it reveals how law, informality, and power interweave in large-scale redevelopment projects. Theoretical FrameworkThis study draws upon a Foucauldian understanding of power and truth to explore how legality is not simply imposed but continuously reconstructed through discursive struggles. Power relations, rather than being external to law, are embedded within it. They determine:Who has authority to interpret legal norms;How concepts such as vested rights are defined;Whose interests are privileged in practice.From this perspective, urban planning processes are not only technical or administrative but discursive arenas where actors compete to shape legality. Informality, therefore, does not merely exist outside formal systems; it emerges from within them, sustained by contradictions and conflicts in governance. MethodologyThe study applies Foucauldian discourse analysis to the concept of vested rights (haghe maktasabeh) in the revision of the Samen district plan.Case context:The Samen district redevelopment project, initiated in the 1990s around the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza, covered 360 hectares.Conceived as a self-financed scheme using land value capture (rent-gap), it envisioned 365 high-density commercial-residential buildings (9–12 floors).To attract investors, Mashhad Municipality implemented extensive deregulation, including:A guaranteed 30% internal rate of return (IRR);Zoning exceptions and exemptions from building regulations;Unauthorized transactions involving third-party assets without owner consent.By the 2010s, the municipality had signed nearly 300 agreements with private entities, banks, and state-owned enterprises. When the plan was revised (2013–2019), disputes arose over whether prior agreements constituted vested rights. Competing claims produced four distinct legal discourses, reflecting deep conflicts between actors.Data collection:15 narrative in-depth interviews with experts and stakeholders;200 official documents (plans, correspondence, approvals, reports);130 unofficial sources (press reports, speeches, institutional websites).Through discourse analysis, the study identifies intra-, inter-, and extra-discursive contestations shaping legality and informality. Results and DiscussionThe findings reveal that the revision of the Samen plan was characterized by competing discourses of vested rights, each linked to specific power configurations. These were classified as:Extralegal discourse – justifying actions outside formal law under exceptional conditions;Extended discourse – expanding prior agreements into broad claims of vested rights;Reconciliatory discourse – seeking compromise between legality and expedience;Argumentative discourse – contesting definitions of legality through legalistic reasoning.Together, these discourses illustrate how elite informality is reproduced not in opposition to the formal planning system but through it. Power struggles embedded in contradictions within the system generate overlapping zones of legality and illegality.Key contradictions include:Central vs. local authority: conflicts between national institutions and municipal power.Public vs. private interests: competing claims over whose rights and benefits are prioritized.Enforcement costs: debates over who bears the burden of compliance and regulation.Regulation vs. deregulation: shifting boundaries between “customary” deregulated practices and formal legal requirements.Through these contestations, vested rights were selectively legitimized, enabling elite actors to pursue projects outside standard planning procedures while maintaining a veneer of legality. ConclusionThis study demonstrates that elite informality in Mashhad’s Samen district was not simply an illegal deviation but a product of discursive power struggles within the planning system itself. Structural contradictions in governance—central/local, public/private, enforcement/non-enforcement, regulation/deregulation—generated competing legal claims that ultimately legitimized elite practices.The result is a reproduction of informality from within formality, where illegal actions are gradually normalized and incorporated into planning processes. This challenges the binary distinction between formal and informal, suggesting that urban governance operates through a fluid continuum of legality and illegality.Power, in this context, does not merely suspend law but actively reshapes it, redefining the boundaries of what counts as legal or illegal. By analyzing vested rights discourses in Mashhad, this article highlights how elite informality is discursively reproduced, posing critical challenges for urban planning systems that seek to uphold legality while accommodating economic and political power.
Urban Management
sara vosoughi; Behnaz Aminzadeh
Abstract
Highlights: Justice, trust, effectiveness, intrusiveness, complexity, and revenue allocation are critical factors in the public acceptability of the Tehran congestion pricing scheme. Lack of trust and justice are the most important variables that reduce the public acceptability of the Tehran congestion ...
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Highlights: Justice, trust, effectiveness, intrusiveness, complexity, and revenue allocation are critical factors in the public acceptability of the Tehran congestion pricing scheme. Lack of trust and justice are the most important variables that reduce the public acceptability of the Tehran congestion pricing scheme. Perceived effectiveness of the Tehran congestion pricing reduces in the second year of the implementation of the scheme. 1. Introduction Congestion charging schemes are implemented in an increasing number of cities as a method of reducing traffic congestion and air pollution. Studies such as Schade & Schlag (2000: 93) and Huber et al. (2020:666) indicate that public acceptability plays a crucial role in the success of these schemes. According to research findings (Schmöcker et al., 2012: 15-17; Fujii et al., 2004: 290-293), factors influencing public acceptability vary by socioeconomic context. Given the absence of such studies in Iran, this paper investigates what factors affect the public acceptability of congestion charging schemes (2018-19) in Tehran. The answer to this question can be useful for urban authorities to better manage congestion charging schemes. 2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Factors effective on public acceptance It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of acceptability and acceptance. Acceptability concerns the attitude towards a specific object like congestion pricing. In contrast, acceptance pertains to some kind of behavior exhibited as a reaction to an object. It is assumed that attitudes guide people’s behaviors and reactions (Schade & Schlag, 2000: 5). Indeed, the public acceptability of congestion charging schemes is a crucial factor in specification of people’s reactions or behaviors in regard to them. A review of the literature on the public acceptability of transport pricing policies indicates several effective factors, including justice or fairness (Gu et al., 2018: 98; Jakobsson et al., 2000: 154-153; Ittner et al., 2003), expected effectiveness (Schuitema et al., 2010: 588; Jakobsson et al., 2000: 155-156), trust in the government (Sugiarto et al., 2020: 144-145; Grisolía et al., 2015: 38), perceived intrusiveness (Huber et al., 2020: 657), revenue allocation (Glavic et al., 2017: 81; Ubbels & Verhoef, 2005), problem awareness (Jaensirisak et al., 2005: 149-150; Schmöcker et al., 2012: 10), complexity (Gu et al., 2018: 98), social norms (Jakobsson et al., 2000: 154; Schade & Schlag, 2003: 48), and privacy (Ison & Rye, 2005: 461). The context (social, political, and economic) determines which of these factors are most effective on public judgment. 2.2. Case study The implementation of the congestion pricing scheme in Tehran started in 1980. Since then, the entry of private cars to the central business district (CBD) has been limited, and only drivers with permits have had access to the area. The main policy for reduction of congestion in the CBD of Tehran, specification of limited access areas has been implemented for nearly forty years. In 2018, the city administrators decided to change this policy to facilitate public access to the district, and proposed a congestion charging zone and a low-emission zone. All citizens can pay for daily charges to drive into the former zone, and have limited access (based on the number of days) into the latter. The main purpose of our research is to investigate what factors influence the public acceptability of this new congestion pricing scheme for the CBD of Tehran in two consecutive years (2018-2019). 3. Methodology The content analysis method is applied to analyze almost 350 online comments made by users on the news about Tehran congestion pricing schemes in 2018-2019. 4. Result and Discussion The findings indicate that six effective factors, including justice, trust, influence, intrusiveness, complexity, and revenue allocation, are critical in specification of the public opinion about the Tehran congestion pricing scheme. Problem awareness, social norms, and privacy—the other factors identified in the review of the literature—are not observed in the content analysis of the comments. The investigation demonstrates that the public acceptability of the Tehran congestion pricing scheme is heavily affected by two variables. Firstly, a low level of public trust in government policies causes a negative attitude toward them, with some arguing that the Tehran congestion pricing policy is not aimed at environmental concerns or congestion management, and it is the financial advantage of such policies that encourages the administrators to adopt them. Secondly, the public evaluates the Tehran congestion pricing scheme as unjust and unfair. According to the findings, low-income groups and residents of the congestion area perceive the scheme as less just because it does not consider their needs and conditions. This causes an increase in the sense of social discrimination, especially among low-income groups. Furthermore, the results show that the perceived effectiveness of the Tehran congestion pricing decreases in the second year of the implementation of the scheme. 5. Conclusion The results indicate that the lack of trust in local administrative policies and the sense of injustice are the most crucial variables in the public judgment of the Tehran congestion pricing scheme. Based on these findings, the authors provide recommendations for further studies on the impacts of the Tehran congestion scheme on public welfare in different income groups and the way the pricing systems can be adjusted to their different socio-economic needs. Furthermore, investigation of the methods of building trust in pricing policies can be useful for local administrators to better implement congestion pricing schemes around Iran.
